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1 Introduction
It is often argued that an important objective of recycling activities is to reduce the so-
ciety’s demand for natural resources such as virgin timber and raw minerals (Kinnaman,
2006). As examples of economic instruments to facilitate recycling activities, environ-
mental economists have studied the functions of policy measures that range from direct
subsidies for recycling activities to more indirect policies such as taxes on the extractions
of natural resources and volume-based disposal fees in collecting solid household wastes.
Existing studies on these economic instruments have mainly focused on demonstrating
how a certain combination of policy instruments is able to attain the first-best, or the
second-best result by considering the social cost of depleting natural resources as well as
the costs of garbage disposal and landfill.1 The scope of this note is rather limited, and
we focus on examining how an individual economic policy measure affects the amount of a
natural resource harvested by individual producers. Our main finding is that an increase
in recycling subsidy for consumers and an increase in garbage disposal fee on consumers
can respectively lead to an increase in the amount of a natural resource harvested by
producers. Hence, under certain circumstances, these economic instruments can indeed
accelerate the depletion of a natural resource stock.
2 The Model
Our static model of an economy with a recyclable product consists of L households and
N producers (L > 1 and N > 1). We assume that both households and producers behave
as price-takers. Let us start by describing a representative household’s behavior.
2.1 The Behavior of a Household
A representative household consumes two kinds of consumer products, a recyclable prod-
uct, q, and, a numeraire, z. We suppose that the consumption of q units of the recyclable
product yields q units of waste to be disposed of by a household while the consumption of
the numeraire generates no waste, for simplicity. Each household is rational or far-sighted
1Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) concisely summarize the main findings of both theoretical and em-
pirical studies on the economics of household waste management.
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in the sense that, in determining how much of the goods it purchases, it takes into ac-
count the eventual waste disposal cost following its consumption. In disposing of its own
waste, each household has two options. One is to use regular household garbage disposal
service, and the other is to resort to municipal collection service specifically designed for
subsequent recycling of household waste into a productive input.2 We consider that the
latter way of disposal causes some disutility to the household in sorting and treating its
waste properly, as well as inconvenience involved in its temporary storage and the trans-
portation of the waste to a proper collection site at a pre-specified date. The household
must pay a volume-based fee, δ, per unit of its waste intended for recycling, rS, to the
collector of the recyclable waste.3 On the other hand, the household must pay a fixed
handling charge of τ per unit of garbage, g, for regular garbage disposal service. Note
that we always have g = q − rS. We assume that δ is strictly smaller than τ .
Under these settings, a representative household’s problem is to solve the following
constrained utility maximization problem with respect to the demand for the recyclable
product, qD, the supply of the recyclable waste, rS, and the consumption level of the
numeraire z:
Max
qD,rS ,z
U = u(qD, rS) + z, (1)
s.t. pqD + z + δrS + τg ≤ w (2)
qD ≥ r, (3)
where p and w are the output price of the recyclable product and the household’s total
income, respectively. In (1), u(qD, rS) is a part of the household’s utility level that is
associated with the recyclable product. We suppose that it has the following properties:
uqD > 0, uqDqD < 0, urS < 0, urSrS < 0, and urSqD = 0.
4
2Municipal collection service of general and recyclable garbages are quite prevalent (Walls, Macauley
and Anderson, 2005). We assume that neither a household nor a producer do not take into account the
potential impacts of profit or loss incurred by a waste collecting municipality.
3We consider here that the actual collectors of the recyclable waste are municipal governments, which
can sell the waste to the producers afterwards and distribute the profit in a lump-sum manner. Also,
note that a household does not receive any monetary payment from the producer, as opposed to what
is typically assumed in existing studies. We have confirmed that the inclusion of the monetary payment
for supplying the recycling input into the household’s budget constraint does not alter the qualitative
results of the comparative statics significantly.
4The last property on the cross-partial term implies that the utility function is additively-separable,
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The first-order conditions for the utility maximization problem are
uqD(qD, rS)− p− τ = 0, (4)
urS(qD, rS)− δ + τ = 0. (5)
These are fairly straight-forward marginal conditions. In particular, (5) implies that the
amount of the recyclable input supply is determined by a household in such a way that the
marginal disutility of treating its waste for the recycling purpose is equal to the difference
between the collection fees of regular waste and of the recyclable input.
2.2 The Behavior of a Producer
Now we turn to a representative firm’s behavior. A firm’s objective is to maximize its
profit by selling the recyclable product, q. Each producer can process the recyclable
waste it obtains to create an input which can be used for producing the original output.5
The producer also uses a virgin input harvested from its own natural resource stock as
an input. The production function of the recyclable product is q(h, rD), where h is the
amount of the harvested natural resource and rD is the amount of the recyclable input
which the firm obtains. We suppose that this production function has the following
properties: qh > 0, qhh < 0, qrD > 0, qrDrD < 0, and qhrD > 0.
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The profit maximization problem of a representative firm can be written as
Max
h,rD
Π(h, rD) = pq(h, rD)− C(h)− th− prrD, (6)
where the convex function C(h) signifies the cost of harvesting and processing the vir-
gin natural resource for the production purpose, t is the per-unit tax on the harvested
which is a standard assumption when the cost of treating recyclable wastes is explicitly incorporated.
5Although quite unrealistic, we suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that the firm can transform the
recyclable waste into the production input costlessly. The inclusion of such a cost will not alter any
qualitative results of this study.
6The last property implies that the marginal product of the recyclable input increases as the use of
the harvested input rises. Indeed, utilizing a recycled input exclusively in a production process tends to
become very costly or even impossible as the production level increases, as is exemplified by some cases
of paper and plastic products where their production and consumption processes significantly alter the
qualities of the inputs. As a result, it becomes increasingly difficult to produce a quality product by
more disproportional use of a recycled input.
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resource, and pr is the price per unit of the recyclable input, which is determined within
the recyclable input market.
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are
pqh(h, rD)− Ch(h)− t = 0, (7)
pqrD(h, rD)− pr = 0. (8)
2.3 Market Equilibrium
Finally, as both the product and input markets need to clear in equilibrium, we have the
following two market equilibrium conditions:
LqD = Nq(h, rD), (9)
LrS = NrD, (10)
where (9) is for the output market and (10) is for the recyclable input market. The
market equilibrium is described by (4), (5), (7), (8), (9) and (10).
3 Comparative Statics
Totally differentiating (4), (5), (7), (8), (9) and (10) with respect to the endogenous
variables and policy variables, we are able to conduct comparative statics analysis of our
model. The main finding can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. An increase in a recycling subsidy for households and an increase in
a disposal fee on household waste respectively have ambiguous impacts on the level of
the natural resource harvested by firms, whereas the increase in the tax on the resource
harvest necessarily discourages the firm’s harvesting effort.
Proof. See the comparative statics results in Appendix. Q.E.D.
This proposition hints a rather alarming possibility that an attempt to encourage the
recycling activities by way of an increase in a recycling subsidy for consumers as well as
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an increase in a garbage disposal fee actually leads to a detrimental consequence in the
light of natural resource conservation.
We can explain the mechanisms behind Proposition 1 as follows. On the one hand,
an increase in the subsidy encourages the households to conduct more recycling activities
and raises the availability of the recyclable input in this input market, which induces
the firms’ input substitution toward this recyclable input. On the other hand, due to an
increase in this subsidy, the consumers’ demand for the recyclable output rises, which
can raise the firm’s input demand for the natural resource. Proposition 1 indicates the
possibility that the interactions of these effects in the output and input markets may
result in an increase in the resource harvesting activities. It is also intriguing to note that
the sign of the change in the price of the recyclable input with respect to the increase in
a recycling subsidy is ambiguous because of the hike in the firm’s production level.
The impacts of an increase in the volume-based garbage fee work quite differently.
Its increase certainly dampens the household’s demand for the output as it implies an
increase in its overall disposal cost. At the same time, it encourages the recycling activities
by the households as this mode of disposal becomes economically more attractive, which
has a favorable impact on the firm’s production through an increase in the availability
of the recyclable input. These two considerations produce ambiguous results not just in
the output quantity and recyclable input price levels but also in the firm’s demand for
the natural resource input.
Let us look more closely into the comparative statics results in order to obtain the
conditions under which an economic measure backfires in terms of inducing greater re-
source harvesting efforts by the firms. As for the effect of providing a recycling subsidy for
households upon the natural resource harvest, we can obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2. An increase in a recycling subsidy for households is more likely to in-
crease the natural resource harvested by firms when 1) the marginal utility of the recyclable
product, q, diminishes slowly, 2) the marginal product of the recycled input, r, is lower, 3)
the number of households in an economy, L, is sufficiently larger relative to the number
of resource-owning firms, N , and 4) the magnitude of the cross-partial derivative, qhrD ,
is more significant.
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Proof. Through the examination of the comparative statics result of h with respect to δ,
i.e., (A2) in Appendix, we can derive the above conditions that contribute to making its
overall sign turns out to be negative. Q.E.D.
The first condition concerns the household’s preference for the recyclable output. When
the household possesses less risk-averse preference with respect to the recyclable product,
such a situation is more likely to occur. In addition, this is likely to be the case when
the absolute consumption level is relatively small. These situations are probably more
applicable to developing countries rather than developed countries.
Secondly, lower productivity of the recyclable input tends to increase the firms’ re-
liance on the natural resource input in order to cater to the increased consumers’ demand
for the product after the increase in the recycling subsidy. This case is more plausible in
an industry where a recycling-related production technology is still in its infancy.
The third condition can be interpreted in the context of the abundance of the con-
cerned natural resource in an economy in relation to its population size. It implies that,
when the population size is relatively larger, given a fixed number of resource owning
firms, the increase in the recycling subsidy is more likely to contribute to the depletion of
the natural resource stock. This suggests that the government of such a resource scarce
nation needs to be more careful in their choices of economic instruments.
Finally, the last condition states that this backfire case is likely to occur when the
marginal productivity of the recyclable input can be enhanced greatly by the concurrent
use of the natural resource input. This is presumably the case in paper and plastic
industries where it becomes increasingly more difficult to produce a high quality product
with the disproportional use of a recycled input.
Furthermore, we can obtain the following proposition concerning the effects of impos-
ing a disposal fee on household waste:
Proposition 3. An increase in a garbage disposal fee on households is more likely to
increase the natural resource harvested by firms when 1) the marginal utility of the recy-
clable product, q, diminishes slowly, 2) the marginal product of the recycled input, r, is
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lower, 3) the number of households in an economy, L, are large relative to the number of
resource-owning firms, N , 4) the magnitude of the cross-partial derivative, qhrD , is more
significant, and 5) the marginal disutility of recycling increases slowly.
Proof. By closely examining the comparative statics result of h with respect to τ , i.e.,
(A3) in Appendix, we can derive the above favorable conditions that make its overall sign
negative. Q.E.D.
This proposition identifies the conditions under which an increase in the volume-based
garbage fee on consumers backfires in terms of inducing greater resource harvesting efforts
by firms. Indeed, the first four observations coincide with those obtained in Proposition
2 for the recycling subsidy whereas the ways in which these two policies function are not
exactly the same as we have seen above. As for the last condition, one possible explana-
tion can be provided in the context of the opportunity cost of time for households. This
condition is applicable when the opportunity cost of time increases rather slowly, which is
again typical of households in developing nations where good employment opportunities
are rather limited.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this note, we have found that an increase in a recycling subsidy for consumers and an
increase in a disposal fee on household waste can respectively contribute to an increase
in the harvesting efforts of a natural resource input by firms. Overall, our investigations
indicate that a resource-scarce developing nation is more liable to witness those backfire
cases. Our finding calls for, at least, more careful implementations of these economic
instruments.
As a direction of future studies, an important extension of our static model is to
incorporate dynamic aspects of recycling activities and natural resource use, especially
taking into account the evolution of a resource stock. Also, it would be interesting to
examine how the presence of market power can alter our analytical outcomes.
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Appendix: Comparative Statics Results
Based on this system of equations, (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), and (10), we can obtain the
so-called comparative statics equation as follows:
uqDqD uqDrS 0 0 −1 0
urSqD urSrS 0 0 0 0
0 0 pqhh − Chh pqhrD qh 0
0 0 pqrDh pqrDrD qrD −1
−L 0 Nqh NqrD 0 0
0 L 0 −N 0 0


dqD
drS
dh
drD
dp
dpr
 =

dτ
dδ − dτ
dt
0
0
0
 ,
where the sign of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix, J , can be found eventually as:∣∣J∣∣ = (−L)urSrS(pqhh − Chh)(−N)−NqhhurSrS(−N) > 0. (A1)
Given (A1) and the assumptions on the household’s utility and firm’s production functions
described in the text, we can obtain the following comparative statics results with respect
to the three different types of economic instruments:
∂qD
∂δ
=
(pqhh − Chh)NqDL− pqhrDNqhL∣∣J∣∣ < 0,
∂rS
∂δ
=
(−1)[−(pqhh − Chh)(−L)(−N)]− qhuqDqDNqh(−N)∣∣J∣∣ < 0,
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∂h
∂δ
=
(−L)LpqhrD + qh(−uqDqDLNqrD)∣∣J∣∣ R 0, (A2)
∂p
∂δ
=
uqDqD(pqhh − Chh)NqrDL∣∣J∣∣ > 0,
∂pr
∂δ
=
LuqDqD [qhhpqrDrDN + qrD(pqhh − Chh)N(1 + qrD)] + L2(pqhh − Chh)pqrDrD∣∣J∣∣ R 0,
∂qD
∂τ
=
−(pqhh − Chh)NqrDL− (−pqhrDNqhL)− qhurSrSNqh(−N)∣∣J1∣∣ R 0,
∂rS
∂τ
=
−(pqhh − Chh)(−N)(−L) + qhuqDqDNqh(−N)∣∣J1∣∣ > 0,
∂h
∂τ
=
−(−L)LpqhrD − qh[−urSrS(−L)(−N)]− qh(−uqDqDLNqrD)∣∣J∣∣ R 0, (A3)
∂p
∂τ
=
(−L)NuqDqD [(pqhh − Chh) + (pqhh − Chh)qrD − pqhrDqh]∣∣J∣∣ < 0,
∂pr
∂τ
=
−LurSrS [pqrDh(−N)qh − qrD(pqhh − Chh)] + L2[−(pqhh − Chh)pqrDrD + pqhrDpqhrD ]∣∣J∣∣
+
LuqDqD [pqhrDqrDNqh + pqhrDNqrDqh − qhpqrDrDNqh − (pqhh − Chh)NqrDqrD ]∣∣J∣∣ R 0,
∂qD
∂t
=
−urSrSNqh(−N)∣∣J∣∣ < 0,
∂rS
∂t
=
0∣∣J∣∣ = 0,
∂h
∂t
=
(−1)[−urSrS(−L)(−N)]∣∣J∣∣ < 0.
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